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neighboring countries.1 As a brutal genocide, the
events in Rwanda could not escape comparison to the
Holocaust. It was after the Holocaust that the United
Nations organized a Genocide Convention in 1948 as
part of the international community’s commitment
that the genocidal horrors “never again” be repeated.
The Convention’s immediate goals were to clarify
genocide in legal terms as a criminal act, thereby
making it legally imperative for nations ratifying the
Convention to attempt to halt any genocidal acts. The
Convention defined genocide as the intention to
destroy wholly or partially a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group. Genocide became an unacceptable
tool of political or military authority, with the international community organized through the United
Nations to act as watchdog for prevention.2
Much of the scholarly writing on the genocide in
Rwanda has focused on the causes of the genocide,
explained in terms of Rwandan history. Scholars agree
that ethnic tensions existed between Hutus and
Tutsis, but disagree about the depth of traditional
divisions between these two groups.3 This debate is
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In 1994 Rwanda suffered a genocide of unprecedented speed. Western press coverage at the time
attributed the genocide to ancient ethnic hatreds
between Hutus and Tutsis, but the genocide was, in
fact, a political act involving the Rwandan government
that planned it and the international community that
stood back and observed it. This international community included Western states, international organizations, and neighboring African states. The world
community seems to tread a fine line between violating
national autonomy and working together across
borders to maintain a standard for human rights.
Moreover, genocide places the effects of national selfinterest on international relations in stark relief, often
to the detriment of less developed countries. Though
Rwandans organized and carried out the genocide, no
actor on the world stage ever performs in isolation.
The international community, collectively in the form
of various organizations and states, influenced the
genocide both by abandoning Rwanda in its time of
need, as well as contributing to factors leading to the
genocide.
Africa has long grabbed the attention of the world
with its civil wars and massacres, but the Rwandan
genocide is an extreme case. Within only a few
months, ethnic Hutu extremists planned the genocide
and then murdered approximately 800,000 Tutsi men,
women and children. Two million Rwandans fleeing
the killings became refugees within Rwanda and in
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Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa
(Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999), 229.
2
Robert F. Gorman, “Genocide,” Great Debates at the United
Nations: An Encyclopedia of 50 Key Issues, 1945-2000 (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), 96-99; Alexander Laban
Hinton, ed., Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of
Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 1-6.
3
Mahmood Mamdani is part of the group of scholars that
believes that the colonial experience exacerbated any political,
ethnic, and economic divisions that may have existed before
colonialism. On the other side of the debate, Philip Gourevitch,
Catharine Newbury , and David Newbury believe that ethnicity
was created as a political construct within Rwanda during
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significant considering that ethnic differences, to some
extent, influenced the genocide. Some scholars have
also discussed economic causes for the genocide.4
Rwanda, already a poor country by international
standards, experienced economic hardship in the
1980s, and these economic difficulties often reinforced
views of Hutu and Tutsi class differences.5 Focusing
on the international impact of economics as opposed
to the national, some scholars have discussed the
influence of Western states’ and organizations’ economic aid in Rwanda in the years leading up to the
genocide. In continuing to provide aid to Rwanda
despite governing Hutus’ racist policies against Tutsis,
the donor countries were unofficially supporting the
government’s human rights abuses. Rwanda’s increasing debts to donor countries also contributed to
the negative economic situation despite benevolent aid
intentions.6
These economic factors placed the
Rwandan government in a desperate situation, which
prompted some officials to extreme measures. While
many scholars have explored international political
actors’ responses to the genocide, there has been very

March 2005

little work on the responses of non-governmental
organizations like the Red Cross or Christian missionary groups. This study will comprehensively explore
the role of the international community in the forms of
the UN, the United States, Belgium, France, Western
Christian missionary groups, the Red Cross, Doctors
Without Borders, and neighboring African states.
The history of ethnic relations in Rwanda is often
mistakenly described as one in which primordial
“tribal” conflict eventually resulted in genocide.
Ethnicity, however, is a social construction that is
contextually relative. Ethnic identity often varies by
situation, and indeed, the identities of Hutu and Tutsi
had fluid ethnic boundaries. Even after colonialism
hardened the distinction between them, social and
political forces continued to construct and manipulate
Hutu and Tutsi ethnicity for various reasons.7 At one
point in the distant past the Hutus and Tutsis belonged to different ethnic groups that migrated to the
region of Rwanda, but after centuries of living together
and intermarrying, they came to share a language,
religion, and other cultural traditions. Their differences largely centered on economic status, as the Tutsi
predominately raised cattle for their livelihood and the
Hutu farmed. 8 There were some differences in social
status as well. A kingdom state developed in Rwanda,
and while official position appointments were controlled by a Tutsi monarchy and chiefs were usually
Tutsi, Hutus could also be chiefs, especially in posi-

colonial times, and post-colonial governments perpetuated it as
a political agenda.
4
Scholars supporting the economic causes of the genocide
include Helen Hintjens and David Newbury.
5
Helen Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,”
Journal of Modern African Studies 37 (1999): 256-258; David
Newbury, “Understanding Genocide,” African Studies Review 40
(1998): 89-90.
6
Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in
Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc.,
1998), 1-4; Regine Andersen, “How Multilateral Development
Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda,” Third World
Quarterly 21 (2000): 441.
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tions of agricultural authority.9 While people’s identity
as belonging to a particular group remained generally
intact over time, Hutu or Tutsi group membership was
not their sole identity. Kinship, clan (which often was
inclusively Hutu and Tutsi), and class were often more
important markings of social identity during precolonial history.10
The Germans were the first colonialists to arrive in
the Rwanda region in 1897, and they remained until
they lost the territory to the Belgians after World War
I. When the Germans set about structuring their
administrative rule, they saw the Tutsi-led kingdom as
an instrument of control over the people. The Germans’ racist attitudes also influenced how they perceived the kingdom. The colonialists viewed the fairer
and taller Tutsis as a superior race to the Hutu; this
notion seemed to be validated by the fact that the Tutsi
dominated political leadership. The Germans theorized that the Tutsi had migrated from the north,
possibly even from west Asia, and then set themselves
up to rule over the inferior (and smaller, darker)
Hutu.11 This imaginary scenario, based in nineteenthcentury Social Darwinian ideology, worked well for the
colonialists, because the colonial administrators could
simply perpetuate the “natural” social structures by
giving Tutsis positions of leadership. When the
Belgians became the new colonial lords, they continued using the system that the Germans had set up.
The Belgians reified ethnic distinctions by instituting
identity cards in 1933 naming the bearers as Tutsi or

Historical Perspectives

Hutu. However, their system of distributing the cards
confused and artificially strengthened pre-colonial
“ethnic” identities of Rwandans, and in many cases
ignored the self- and ancestral identity of the individuals. Colonial rulers favored Tutsis in political and
religious leadership, employment opportunities, and
education (using the identity cards to help them
distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis).12 Through the
years of Rwandan colonial experience, ethnicity
became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and its function as a
fixed identity marker disadvantaged Hutus and benefited Tutsis.
As independence movements gained momentum in
Africa, Hutu populations in Rwanda sought independence for themselves. However, in their revolutionary
struggles to restructure Rwandan society, Hutu
activists targeted the downfall of the Tutsi monarchy
as the key to their freedom rather than the complete
removal of the Belgian colonialists. The Hutus were
aided in their efforts to grab power because prior to
granting independence in 1962, the Belgian trusteeship (working with the UN) replaced many Tutsi
authorities with Hutus. The Church and European
governments were influenced by post-World War II era
ideologies that connected colonialism to favored, and
thus, suspect leadership groups. When independence
was granted to Rwanda in 1962, the new government
was mostly Hutu. Many Hutus internalized the
European colonialists’ view of Rwandan history to the
degree that they came to see themselves as the indigenous Rwandan population, suffering for years under
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Prunier, 9-12.
Newbury and Newbury, 293.
11
Prunier, 5-9.
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the “foreign” rule of the conquering Tutsis.13 During
the struggle to gain power at independence, 20,000
Tutsis were killed and thousands sought refuge in
neighboring states, which increased perceived divisions between Hutus and Tutsis.14
The first independent leader of Rwanda was
Gregoire Kayibanda, and during his presidency, ethnic
divisions between Hutus and Tutsis established by the
colonialists intensified. With Hutus now the elite
ruling class, it was they who reaped the benefits of an
ethnically prejudiced system, and the Tutsis who
suffered.15 The second independent presidency, of
Juvenal Habyarimana, starting in 1973, generally
continued anti-Tutsi policies.16 Economic problems,
political problems of declining legitimacy, external
situations of Hutu and Tutsi conflict in Burundi and
Uganda, and an influx of refugees led to increasing
disapproval of Habyarimana’s leadership, especially
among extremist Hutus who disliked his attempts, in
the face of international pressure, to negotiate an end
to the war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a
largely Tutsi army based in Uganda that demanded the
return of Tutsi refugees and Tutsi representation in
government.
Habyarimana’s political favor also
plummeted among the rural Hutu population that
feared an invasion by RPF Tutsis. Returning Tutsis
might reclaim land and property taken over in their
absence, a prospect that was especially alarming to the

Historical Perspectives

coffee farmers who had largely turned to subsistence
farming on former Tutsi lands when the price of coffee
dropped on the world market.17
With all of these problems faced by the
Habyarimana regime, violence against Tutsis was a
tool of the government to maintain power while “punishing” a cultural scapegoat. During the early 1990s,
Tutsis were blacklisted, arrested, and killed in raids
that were encouraged, if not planned, by extremist
Hutu members of the president’s circle.18 Peace
accords, reached during negotiations in Arusha,
Tanzania, in the early 1990s, between the RPF and
Habyarimana’s government declared that current
political leaders would share the future Rwandan
government with RPF leadership and that some
extremist Hutu parties would be excluded. It was the
potential implementation of the Arusha Accords that
prompted the extremists, fearing loss of power, to use
genocide as a political tool.19 The genocide’s first
victim would not be any Tutsi but the man viewed by
the extremists as most responsible for allowing the
Arusha Accords, the president himself.
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana
and the Burundian president, Cyprien Ntaryamira,
was shot down, killing both presidents. Although it is
still not certain who was responsible, this event
seemed to mark the planned start of the genocide.
Within hours roadblocks throughout the capital of
Kigali were set up, Tutsi and opposition Hutu names
were spread, and groups of government soldiers,

13

Hintjens, 254-255.
Rene Lemarchand, “Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda
and the Holocaust Reconsidered,” Journal of Genocidal Research
4 (2002): 503.
15
Newbury and Newbury, 298-299, Uvin, 35.
16
Lemarchand, 504.
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police, and youth group militias searched out the
victims, whom they began to massacre.20 Although the
majority of victims were Tutsis of all social and political groups, Hutus opposing Habyarimana’s regime
were also targeted. The massacres spread out from
the capital into surrounding areas of Rwanda and
drew in masses of low-class Hutus to join the “professionals” in wielding mostly machetes to murder men,
women, and children. Orders and encouragement to
join the killers permeated the country through official
political chains of command, starting at the top of the
government leadership. People at any political level or
social class who were reluctant to kill were cajoled,
enticed by the property of potential victims, or threatened with death themselves.21 Propaganda to join in
the killing was also spread by the extremist Hutu radio
station Radio des Mille Collines (RTLM), which aided
the killers by directing them to locations where victims
were hiding. The RTLM broadcasts, like the extremist
Hutus in the government, ignored the distinction
between Tutsi civilians and the Tutsi-led RPF guerilla
army invading Rwanda from Uganda. Many Hutus
were encouraged to feel that their lives were in danger
from their well-known Tutsi neighbors.22 Meanwhile
the RPF was attempting to halt the genocide, but not
by slaughtering Hutu civilians. The RPF aim was to
reach the capital of Kigali as soon as possible to take
over the government. In the face of the international
community’s lack of action, it was indeed the RPF’s

March 2005

capture of Kigali on July 2 that heralded the end of the
genocide.23
If the international community had intervened, this
tragedy could have been halted early on, if not prevented altogether. Instead, the Rwandans were left to
themselves, to kill or be killed. The international
players that virtually abandoned Rwanda during the
genocide, both states and organizations, had various
reasons for their inadequate response and had various
relationships with pre-genocidal Rwanda. The UN was
no stranger to Rwanda as it participated in the Arusha
Accords’ negotiations between the RPF and the
Rwandan government. The deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to the country in 1993 was part of the
implementation of the Accords’ peace plan. The
operation, called the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR), sent 2,500 troops to the country on a
Chapter Six peacekeeping mandate. The Chapter Six
mandate restricts operations to light weapons for selfdefense only.24 Thus, mandates can restrict UN troops
on the ground from carrying out actions that they may
deem necessary, as in Rwanda in 1994.
The UN was first made aware of genocidal plans in
Rwanda in January 1994 through a cable sent by the
UNAMIR commander in Rwanda, General Romeo
Dallaire, to the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations in New York. A government politician
warned Dallaire of government plans to kill the Tutsi
23
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2000), 290.
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of the genocide.27 In addition to the UN leadership’s
wariness of becoming embroiled in another African
disaster, member states of the UN were equally worried
about the financial costs and potential loss of lives.
Moreover, most countries could not rationalize action
in Rwanda with their own national security or national
interests. With the exception of a few states such as
the Czech Republic and New Zealand, member nations
did not volunteer troops.28 The United States and
Belgium, in fact, even encouraged the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. On April 21, weeks after the
genocide began and as the death toll was mounting,
the UN passed a resolution to reduce the UNAMIR
force by ninety percent.29 The UNAMIR commander
General Dallaire later blamed the member nations for
failing to intervene, saying, “The true culprits are the
sovereign states that influence the Security Council,
that influence other nations into participating or
not.”30 This is an indication of a critical inadequacy of
the UN as an international organization. That is,
problems are inevitable if member states are faced with
a choice between their own good and the common
good. Shortcomings within the leadership of the UN
compounded the effects of the unwillingness of member states to intervene. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of

population as well as Belgian troops, if necessary to
prompt the Belgians to pull out. Dallaire, justifiably
alarmed, suggested that the UN troops raid the massive arms stores in the capital city, to which Dallaire’s
informant could direct them.25 The responding cable
from Kofi Annan, then Deputy Director of Peacekeeping Operations, did not seem to take the threat of
potential massacres seriously. He advised Dallaire to
assume that Habyarimana was not aware of the
genocidal plans and inform him of them. Dallaire was
also told to inform the ambassadors of Belgium, the
United States and France of the potential violence.
However, Annan did not pass the informant’s message
along to the UN Security Council.26 At this point, three
months before the beginning of the genocide, a UN
department and three western governments were
apparently aware of the potential violence being
planned by extremists in the Rwandan government,
but nothing was done.
There are several reasons why the UN avoided
intervention in Rwanda once the genocide began,
including the recent UN mission failure in Somalia
widely covered by the international media, the disinclination of member states to support action in Rwanda,
and the lack of accurate information about the severity
25
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Cameroon was the UN special representative who
supplied UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
with information on the situation in Rwanda. However, Booh-Booh had a conflict of interest because he
actually supported Habyarimana’s regime. BoohBooh’s reports to Boutros-Ghali toned down the speed
and scale of the killings and made it seem as if both
sides were murdering each other in similar numbers.
When Boutros-Ghali received reports from Dallaire
that contradicted some of Booh-Booh’s reports, the
Secretary General took his advice from the latter. 31
The United States’ role in the genocide largely
paralleled the UN role. Because of the death of eighteen U.S. soldiers in the Somali capital the previous
year, Congress resisted joining potentially dangerous
UN operations. National interest also played a role, as
the U.S. appeared to have nothing at stake in the
Rwandan crisis other than a moral obligation to
prevent genocide. The U.S. ambassador to the UN at
the time, Madeleine Albright, pressured other states to
join the U.S. in opposing further involvement in
Rwanda. This coincided with Presidential Decision
Directive 25, which set up guidelines for acceptable
U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.32
Rwanda did not fit the guidelines.
The UN and the United States both faced a dilemma by not intervening in the Rwandan genocide.
According to the Genocide Convention, they both were
morally and legally responsible for acting to prevent
genocide if they knew it was occurring. The solution
for the UN and the U.S. initially was to deny the events
31
32
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as genocide. UN and U.S. leaders publicly avoided
using the term and encouraged their staffs to follow
suit. The U.S. took this word avoidance a step further
by actually forbidding unqualified official use of it.
State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley
openly admitted that qualifying phrases for the term
“genocide” were necessary because, “there are obligations which arise in connection with the use of the
term.”33 James Woods, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs in the Department of
Defense, also noted that the U.S., “didn’t want to know
the full dimensions of this thing and, thereby, assume
the responsibility of having to deal with it.” 34
Belgium and France also played significant roles in
the Rwandan genocide. Belgium’s involvement dated,
of course, from the colonial period. When the UNAMIR
force was first deployed, the largest contingent of
troops was Belgian. The extremist Hutu government
was betting that if European peacekeeping troops were
killed, it would influence them to withdraw. On April
7, the day after Habyarimana’s plane crash, ten
Belgian soldiers, protecting the moderate Hutu Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana, were killed by
genocidaires. The Hutu extremists had planned
correctly. After the peacekeepers’ deaths, the Belgian
government withdrew their soldiers from UNAMIR.
Similar to the U.S. administration, Belgium, placing
national interest above international responsibility,
33
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tionalized racism and policies of anti-Tutsi discrimination should have been apparent, as the French worked
closely with the Rwandan military, many of whose
generals were extremist Hutus. Whether or not France
had any advance information of the genocide, the
French government’s reaction to news of the genocide,
once it became common knowledge within the international community, was as inadequate as the responses
of the UN and the United States. The French government made no official declarations about or against the
genocide. Indeed, Rwandan government leaders were
welcomed in a trip to France weeks into the genocide,
further evidence of French avoidance of the genocide
and French support of Habyarimana’s government.38
In contrast, during this period, Belgium refused to
issue visas for Rwandan government ministers. As the
genocide continued, the French shipment of arms to
Rwanda continued as well, in spite of a UN sanctioned
arms embargo on Rwanda.39 France seemingly ignored
not only the evidence of genocide in Rwanda, but they
also ignored the international community’s admittedly
weak efforts in censuring the Rwandan government.
France finally took the initiative and responded to
the genocide, but even that response was inappropriate. In choosing to respond to the genocide, French
Prime Minister Balladur spoke to the UN Security
Council of a “moral duty” to protect the threatened

decided that intervening in Rwanda was not worth the
risk for Belgian soldiers. 35
France, another influential actor in the international community’s inaction in Rwanda, was unique
among western states because of its close connection
with the Rwandan government before the genocide.
The ties between the two countries were largely personal and cultural. The personal relationship was
based on the friendship of French President François
Mitterand and Rwandan President Habyarimana. The
cultural relationship was grounded in France’s desire
to maintain political, linguistic, and cultural ties with
Francophone African countries.
French motives
stemmed partly from the desire to spread French
culture but also from a phobia of losing ground to
Anglo-Saxon influence on the African continent.36 The
two countries also had a military cooperation agreement since 1975. Beginning in 1990, French troops
joined the government military Forces Armees
Rwandaises (FAR) in fighting the RPF invasions.
France saw the Tutsi-led RPF as promoting
Anglophone interests in Rwanda because the RPF had
emerged from the Anglophone country of Uganda.
While French involvement in actual fighting was not
large-scale, French arms shipments to Rwanda were
huge throughout the early 1990s and even during
1994, when the genocide was obvious.37 Even if
French officials and military leaders had no idea of the
extremity of the Hutus’ genocidal plans, the institu-

38
Rwandan Foreign Minister Bicamumpaka and Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza (the leader of the most extreme Rwandan Hutu
political party) were officially received by President Mitterand,
French Prime Minster Edouard Balladur, and French Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe in Paris on April 27, 1994.
39
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populations and to end the genocide.40 This rhetoric
contradicts the previous French stance that the killing
was not genocide but was just massive casualties on
both sides of a civil war between the RPF and the
government. The reversal of French policy towards
Rwanda prompted international leaders to question
French motives in mounting an armed operation in
Rwanda. South African President Nelson Mandela and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and of course the RPF,
were all concerned that the proposed French military
action was really a cover to aid the FAR.41 However,
the UN approved of the French mission, called Operation Turquoise, which also consisted of Senegalese
troops to keep up appearances of multilateral action.42
Operation Turquoise received a UN Chapter Seven
mandate, which authorized troops on the ground to
use aggressive military action in self-defense and to
protect civilians. Operation Turquoise officially started
on June 22, and succeeded in setting up a “safe zone”
in the country. The beneficiaries of the “safe zone,”
however, were not those who had been most victimized. The French mission probably saved more extremist Hutus fleeing from the advancing RPF than
Tutsis fleeing the genocidaires. To be sure, the Operation saved the lives of some Tutsis and innocent
Hutus, but it did nothing to aid the deteriorating
political situation. In fact, by the time the Operation
began, not only was the genocide winding down (as
most of the Tutsis to be killed had already been

March 2005

murdered), but the RPF was nearing victory in gaining
control of the capital. 43 The French response was
essentially too little, too late.
In looking at the involvement of the international
community in Rwanda it is also important to examine
the role of development aid, including aid from foreign
states and international financial institutions like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). In the 1970s Rwanda was seen as a model
developing country, and international aid poured in
from Western states, especially Switzerland and
Belgium.44 Even after the economic crisis began,
Rwanda signed an agreement with the World Bank for
a ninety million-dollar structural adjustment program
(SAP) in 1991.45 Rwanda’s political stability made it an
ideal recipient country. Although it was clearly a
dictatorship, the government was in undisputed
control of the country, there was an effective administration, and there was a concern for investment in
rural areas. This dictatorship had the problems that
aid and adjustment programs were meant to address
– poverty, high population growth, and environmental
pressures. Other problems, such as human rights
abuses and racism, were not easily solved with donor
money and adjustment programs, so they were ignored. The aid agencies failed to investigate the
political history of Rwanda in their project reports.46
These were grave mistakes. Rwanda was given the
43
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order of the Catholic Church established their missionary movement in Rwanda in the 1880s. This
group of missionaries attempted initially to convert the
traditional leaders of Rwandan society, in the hopes
that once the leaders converted the rest of the population would follow. By the 1930s the majority of
Rwandans had converted to Christianity, and the
devotion lasted. In post-colonial times, Rwanda was
one of the most “Christian” states in Africa. The
missionary attention to leadership extended to the
colonial powers as well as to the African elite. Religious leaders worked closely with the colonial administrations and contributed to the legitimacy of colonial
authority. Church officials and priests preached
obedience to the state as a core Christian value.
Protestant missionaries came to Rwanda after the
Catholics, and while Protestant churches often appealed to the more marginalized populations, Protestants followed the Catholic example of preaching
obedience to the state.48
The relationship between the Church (Catholic and
to a lesser extent Protestant) and the state extended
further than respect for state authority. The churches
played a key role in establishing visions of ethnic
superiority, as they were the original sponsors of the
Hamitic hypothesis, which stated that the superior

impression that what they were doing internally would
be ignored externally.
Following the end of the Cold War, however, the
West added a new condition for aid, democratization,
which, ironically, adversely affected the Rwandan
situation. President Habyarimana was forced to accept
democratization as a goal of structural adjustment, to
avoid economic disaster. However, the extremist
leaders of the government were fearful of potential
power loss, and they became more extreme and antiTutsi in their attempts to retain authority.47 The
effects of aid programs on pre-genocide Rwanda were
twofold. First, as model recipients for aid and development, Rwandan economics and not Rwandan politics
were the focus. Rwanda’s pattern of prejudice and
human rights abuses was initially ignored. Second,
the conditions of receiving aid and adjustment programs were forced moves towards democratization,
which merely pushed Hutu officials towards extremism
as they feared losing power. While foreign aid and
structural adjustment programs cannot be blamed for
the genocide, they were undoubtedly in part responsible for setting the political and economic scene in
Rwanda that eventually led to genocide.
Another large group who had the opportunity to
work for positive change in Rwanda, but did not, were
the Christian Churches and their various missionary
orders. Christian missionaries not only made up a
significant portion of the international community
living in Rwanda, but they had also been intimately
involved in the development of ethnic politics in
Rwanda since the colonial period. The White Fathers
47
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foreigner Tutsis conquered the native inferior Hutus.49
The Catholic Church was also instrumental in constructing ethnic relations in the post-colonial state of
Rwanda. Priests played a crucial role in changing
Belgian colonial support from Tutsis to Hutus as
independence neared. In the 1950s, the typical
Belgian missionary priest coming to Rwanda was a
Flemish “progressive” motivated by theories of social
justice. These priests regarded minority rule as outdated, and they identified with the oppressed Hutu
majority. The Church attitude influenced the Belgian
colonial authorities. Following the Hutu struggle to
gain power, when Belgium was granting independence
to Rwanda, colonial and Church leadership supported
the switch from Tutsi to Hutu leaders.50 After independence, the ties between Church and state were
knotted even tighter. Many of the early Hutu leaders
had Church patrons who not only supervised their
advanced education but also helped them gain positions within the government. Church leaders were
also members of the government. The Archbishop of
Rwanda was a member of the Central Committee of
Habyarimana’s party, the only party until the 1990s.51
Not all religious officials participated in discriminatory
practices against the Tutsis before the genocide, but
neither did the Church stand against the institutionalized racism – cooperation with the state was too deeply
ingrained at this point.
The Church also played a role during the genocide.
Due to the Church’s significant status in Rwandan
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society and the nonexistence of other social organizations, churches and priests often had very close
relationships with community members, especially in
rural areas. Populations went to their churches for
education, economic assistance, healthcare, charity
and employment. These resources furthered the
Church’s status among the people and provided an
image of refuge in tumultuous times. The people
remembered this image during the genocide. Tutsis
often fled to their local churches for safety. The
genocidaires often told Tutsis to gather in churches,
ostensibly for their protection, but in reality to gather
them together to make the killing easier. The range of
nuns’ and priests’ actions during the genocide varies
widely. Some religious leaders attempted to protect
their Tutsi congregations seeking refuge, some did
nothing, and some were actively involved in helping
the killers or even carrying out killing themselves.52
The Church can be held accountable for its complicity
with the extremist Hutus in government and its failure
to take a stand against ethnic discrimination and
violence in Rwanda. 53
There are other international organizations that
should be examined, not because they were directly
complicit with the violence in Rwanda, but because of
their lack of appropriate response to the genocide.
Two groups were the International Committee of the
Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, also
known as Doctors without Borders), the only two
52

Longman (website); Omaar (website).
Rasmus Hylleborg, Lone Moller-Hansen and Allan Poulsen,
“The Rwanda Genocide in 1994 and Danish Baptist Involvement
in the Country,” trans. Allan Poulsen (Report for the Baptist
Union, 1998), 1-7.
53

49

Mamdani, 232.
Longman (website); Omaar (website).
51
Mamdani, 232.
50

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005

Historical Perspectives

21

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 13

Their Genocide and Ours

171

foreigner Tutsis conquered the native inferior Hutus.49
The Catholic Church was also instrumental in constructing ethnic relations in the post-colonial state of
Rwanda. Priests played a crucial role in changing
Belgian colonial support from Tutsis to Hutus as
independence neared. In the 1950s, the typical
Belgian missionary priest coming to Rwanda was a
Flemish “progressive” motivated by theories of social
justice. These priests regarded minority rule as outdated, and they identified with the oppressed Hutu
majority. The Church attitude influenced the Belgian
colonial authorities. Following the Hutu struggle to
gain power, when Belgium was granting independence
to Rwanda, colonial and Church leadership supported
the switch from Tutsi to Hutu leaders.50 After independence, the ties between Church and state were
knotted even tighter. Many of the early Hutu leaders
had Church patrons who not only supervised their
advanced education but also helped them gain positions within the government. Church leaders were
also members of the government. The Archbishop of
Rwanda was a member of the Central Committee of
Habyarimana’s party, the only party until the 1990s.51
Not all religious officials participated in discriminatory
practices against the Tutsis before the genocide, but
neither did the Church stand against the institutionalized racism – cooperation with the state was too deeply
ingrained at this point.
The Church also played a role during the genocide.
Due to the Church’s significant status in Rwandan

172

Historical Perspectives

March 2005

society and the nonexistence of other social organizations, churches and priests often had very close
relationships with community members, especially in
rural areas. Populations went to their churches for
education, economic assistance, healthcare, charity
and employment. These resources furthered the
Church’s status among the people and provided an
image of refuge in tumultuous times. The people
remembered this image during the genocide. Tutsis
often fled to their local churches for safety. The
genocidaires often told Tutsis to gather in churches,
ostensibly for their protection, but in reality to gather
them together to make the killing easier. The range of
nuns’ and priests’ actions during the genocide varies
widely. Some religious leaders attempted to protect
their Tutsi congregations seeking refuge, some did
nothing, and some were actively involved in helping
the killers or even carrying out killing themselves.52
The Church can be held accountable for its complicity
with the extremist Hutus in government and its failure
to take a stand against ethnic discrimination and
violence in Rwanda. 53
There are other international organizations that
should be examined, not because they were directly
complicit with the violence in Rwanda, but because of
their lack of appropriate response to the genocide.
Two groups were the International Committee of the
Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, also
known as Doctors without Borders), the only two
52

49

Mamdani, 232.
Longman (website); Omaar (website).
51
Mamdani, 232.
50

Longman (website); Omaar (website).
Rasmus Hylleborg, Lone Moller-Hansen and Allan Poulsen,
“The Rwanda Genocide in 1994 and Danish Baptist Involvement
in the Country,” trans. Allan Poulsen (Report for the Baptist
Union, 1998), 1-7.
53

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/13

22

Penkert: Their Genocide and Ours

Their Genocide and Ours

174

173

large-scale humanitarian organizations that continued
to operate in Rwanda during the genocide. The Red
Cross and MSF are independent non-governmental
groups that go to areas facing humanitarian crises to
provide medical relief as well as to address underlying
health-related issues, such as providing clean drinking
water and better sanitation facilities. The MSF is often
the first NGO to arrive at a crisis, but their services are
only meant to be temporary, whereas the Red Cross
carries out long-term projects in many countries after
the immediate crisis has ended but while humanitarian relief is still needed.54
MSF and Red Cross workers provided medical care
to survivors of genocidaire attacks in Rwanda. Treating near-fatal machete wounds was a common purpose
of medical teams. Wounded and hiding Tutsis also
sought refuge in the MSF and Red Cross compounds,
and both organizations cared for orphans of the
genocide. The MSF and Red Cross were doing their
jobs to the best of their abilities, considering the
number of volunteers and the amount of available
supplies.55 It is in the area of politics that MSF and
Red Cross were constrained. Publicly choosing sides
in a conflict would limit their effectiveness in future
endeavors. They have to stay neutral to continue
working in areas of conflict. In addition, aid from the
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developed world is often viewed as a cover for political
manipulations in the Third World, and, therefore, MSF
and the Red Cross have to scrupulously and publicly
avoid politics to assure the countries that the aid and
relief comes with no strings attached to Western
governments. These factors limit the ability and
willingness of such organizations to take a stand on
issues about which they have unique access to information. Only after crises, such as the genocide, can
MSF and Red Cross workers speak out politically
about what they witnessed.56
The final group of international actors to examine
regarding the 1994 genocide are three of the states
surrounding Rwanda: Burundi, Uganda, and Congo.
Burundi had the most influence on Rwanda among the
neighbor states in the years from independence until
the genocide, partly due to shared histories and partly
due to the ease of populations crossing borders.
Rwanda and Burundi had been governed by the
colonial powers jointly as one territory. The colonial
powers favored Tutsi minorities in both territories, and
policies of ethnic discrimination were put in place.
Rwanda and Burundi attained independence in 1962,
but unlike the case in Rwanda, Tutsis remained in
control of political and military power in Burundi.
Burundian minority Tutsi officials discriminated
against majority Hutus. The discrimination by both
governments evolved into ethnic violence.57
The violence in each country influenced ethnic
violence in the other. Ethnic violence towards Hutus
in Burundi was the justification Rwandan officials
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used in persecuting Rwandan Tutsis, and violence
against Tutsis in Rwanda was justification for Burundian officials’ persecution of Burundian Hutus. The
movement of refugees fleeing from such persecution
across borders also influenced inter-ethnic relations.
In 1972, Tutsis killed between 100,000 and 200,000
Hutus in Burundi after Hutus attempted to organize
an uprising. This event, referred to by scholars as the
first genocide after the Holocaust, sent Hutus fleeing
across borders to Rwanda, and also played a pivotal
role in aiding future President Habyarimana’s regime
of anti-Tutsi policies. In 1993, Burundi’s first popularly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was
assassinated by the Tutsi-controlled military. The
assassination prompted Burundian Hutus to murder
about 20,000 Tutsis, which the army responded to by
killing about 300,000 Hutus. 58 These events led to
Hutu refugees fleeing into Rwanda, many of whom
later participated in the 1994 genocide.59
The killings of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 and 1993
were used as examples by the Habyarimana regime of
the threat that Tutsis posed to Hutus and as justification for ethnic violence within Rwanda. In addition, as
journalist Philip Gourevitch stated, “Lack of international response to the 1993 massacres in Burundi
permitted Rwandan extremists to expect that they too
could slaughter people in large numbers without
consequences.”60 The ethnic violence used as political
tools by Rwanda and Burundi were inextricably linked
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– when the two states had problems with the policies
of their neighbor, they never engaged in government
dialogue, but simply channeled their anger with their
neighbor to their own populations of their neighbor’s
politically powerful ethnic group.
Uganda was also involved in Rwandan affairs
because many Tutsis fleeing from Hutu extremist
violence throughout the decades after independence
sought refuge in Uganda. There they joined with
Ugandans to create the post-colonial state. However,
under Ugandan President Milton Obote’s two periods
of rule, Rwandan refugees were viewed with hostility,
prompting many to join with Ugandan Yoweri
Museveni’s revolutionary guerilla forces to overthrow
Obote. One Rwandan involved in this guerilla movement was Paul Kagame, future leader of the RPF. After
Museveni’s victorious ascent to power in Uganda, he
changed rules of citizenship so that anyone who had
lived within the country for ten years was a citizen,
partly to acknowledge Rwandan refugees’ aid to his
revolution. However, facing criticism from native
Ugandans, and needing to maintain his legitimacy,
Museveni revoked the changes so that citizenship was
once again dependent on ancestry. Refugee Rwandan
Tutsis, unable to return to Rwanda, were faced with
losing their welcome in Uganda.61 These events played
a significant role in the establishment of the RPF as a
group fighting for the right of Tutsis to return to
Rwanda. Thus, events in Uganda had an influence on
pre-genocide Rwanda, although direct relations at the
state level had not been a factor.
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Congo (Zaire at the time of the genocide) was also
involved in pre-genocidal Rwanda, but unlike Burundi
and Uganda, Congo maintained positive relations
because of the friendship between President Mobutu
Sese Seko and President Habyarimana. Mobutu aided
the Rwandan government’s struggle against the RPF by
assisting the shipments of arms to the Rwandan army
during the genocide. Mobutu also provided bases for
the French Operation Turquoise within Congo, as a
cultivator and recipient of French government support
for his own country.62 While Mobutu did nothing to
halt the genocidal culture developing among extremist
Rwandan Hutus, and, in fact, probably encouraged it
through his support of Habyarimana’s regime, Congo’s
most direct involvement in the affairs of Rwanda
occurred towards the end of the genocide and after it.
Partially through the French Operation Turquoise safezone, Hutu extremists fled the RPF into the protective
custody of refugee camps located in Congo. These
refugee camps, run by numerous international humanitarian organizations, provided a base for the
extremist Hutus in exile to reorganize their violent
anti-Tutsi efforts and to regain support among the
camps’ populations. The extremist Hutus directed
armed battles against the new RPF-controlled government of Rwanda in an attempt to regain power. The
extremists also, tragically, encouraged ethnic violence
against Tutsis living in Congo, even if they were native
Congolese.63
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Were there warning signs of the violence or potential actions that the international community could
have taken? The major warning sign of impending
genocide was supplied by the UNAMIR commander
Dallaire’s informant, but other evidence for a potential
genocide was also ignored by the international community. In 1993, a mission undertaken by International Federation of Human Rights and Africa Watch
found evidence of human rights abuses carried out by
Habyarimana’s regime in the mass graves of Tutsis
killed in 1991 and 1992. Their report was corroborated by a UN human rights official, and the report
was sent to Western governments. The report was
largely ignored or viewed as an exaggeration.64 However, some foreign officials heeded the signs of impending violence. The Foreign Minister of Belgium, Willy
Klaes, warned the UN Secretary General in March
1994 that the current situation in Rwanda, “could
result in an irrepressible explosion of violence.”65
Another ignored warning sign was the hate propaganda pouring out of the Rwandan radio station RTLM
and the newspaper Kangura beginning in the early
1990s. The messages of ethnic hate encouraged
violence against Tutsis and portrayed all Tutsis as
direct threats to Hutu safety.66
Some scholars note that the international community could have undertaken various military actions to
halt the genocide once it began. For example, bombing
the RTLM radio headquarters would have presented
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Were there warning signs of the violence or potential actions that the international community could
have taken? The major warning sign of impending
genocide was supplied by the UNAMIR commander
Dallaire’s informant, but other evidence for a potential
genocide was also ignored by the international community. In 1993, a mission undertaken by International Federation of Human Rights and Africa Watch
found evidence of human rights abuses carried out by
Habyarimana’s regime in the mass graves of Tutsis
killed in 1991 and 1992. Their report was corroborated by a UN human rights official, and the report
was sent to Western governments. The report was
largely ignored or viewed as an exaggeration.64 However, some foreign officials heeded the signs of impending violence. The Foreign Minister of Belgium, Willy
Klaes, warned the UN Secretary General in March
1994 that the current situation in Rwanda, “could
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little risk to the military volunteers heading the operation, and by cutting out the main voice that encouraged and aided killers, lives might have been spared.67
More direct action to halt the genocide would have
involved military presence on the ground in Rwanda,
but this could have occurred in various degrees of
intensity. The UN could have changed the UNAMIR
mandate from Chapter Six to Chapter Seven, authorizing more aggressive force. The UNAMIR forces could
have been enlarged. The Belgian and French paratroopers who were sent in only long enough to evacuate their citizens, could have remained to protect their
citizens and provide an armed presence in Rwanda.68
The UN or the U.S. could have led an intervention force
designed to end the killings. Political scientist Alan
Kuperman theorized that a minimal intervention
consisting of solely air force from outside Rwanda that
either evacuated Tutsis to neighboring countries or
bombed Rwandan government troops, could have
saved up to 75,000 Tutsis from execution.69
Historical events are, to be sure, contingent on a
variety of factors, so it is impossible to know the
outcome of any of these scenarios. Yet, it is clear that
contemporaries did make predictions based on their
assumptions about outcomes. The organizers of the
genocide were betting on international withdrawal
from Rwanda once the genocide exploded. International presence, even without international military
action, might have been enough to dramatically reduce
the killings by genocidal killers armed only with
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machetes. It was only after the international journalists, diplomats, clergy, aid agencies, and businessmen
left Rwanda that the killing became massive and
widespread.70 The international community’s obvious
decision to leave the Rwandans to themselves was a
clear signal to the extremists in power that they could
continue with the genocide as planned without anyone
trying to stop them. Tragically, the same signal that
told the genocide’s organizers they could continue with
their plans also signaled to the populations in Rwanda
that participating in the killing would not incur punishment. Realizing the relative ease with which the
international community could have intervened leads
to questions of why it did not. To prevent genocide
from occurring again, which in all probability it will
somewhere, these questions need to be asked and the
answers explored.
Rwanda had a very troubled history that led to a
culture capable of committing genocide. Many factors
played a role in not only setting Rwanda on the path to
ethnic violence as a state policy, but also in causing
the genocide. Although the genocide had obvious
ethnic expressions, it was a form of political violence
and did not result from ancient ethnic differences.
Because the genocide was a political outcome, it could
have been dealt with in the international community
through political avenues. It should not be denied that
Rwandans were responsible for committing the genocide, but neither should it be ignored that the international community and historical conditions were
influential in setting the stage for assisting the extremist Rwandans to attain power in Rwanda and to
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pursue genocide in a state which was in economic and
political crisis. In addition, the international community, in its various forms, is limited by the necessity of
respecting state sovereignty. States’ national interests
are usually prioritized above those of individual
citizens. Recognizing these aspects of the international system and acknowledging the historical role of
international governmental and non-governmental
actors in events leading to genocide will help explain
the failures in Rwanda. Furthermore, it may help to
avert future genocide under different circumstances.
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